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Abstract—Today’s computer systems must meet and maintain 
service availability, performance, and security requirements. 
Each of these demands requires redundancy and some form of 
isolation. When service requirements are implemented 
separately, the system architecture cannot easily share common 
components of redundancy and isolation. We will present these 
service traits collectively as cyber resilience with a system called 
Self-Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance (SCIT). Further, we will 
demonstrate that SCIT provides an effective resilient cloud 
implementation making cost effective utilization of cloud’s excess 
capacity and economies of scale. Lastly, we will introduce the 
notion of serverless applications utilizing AWS Lambda and how 
a stateless architecture can drastically reduce operational costs 
by utilizing cloud function services. 
 
Index Terms—Cyber Resilience, Security Economics, SCIT, 
AWS Spot, GCP Preemptive 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In our highly connected world, systems are expected to be 
online at all times while maintaining a high degree of security 
and performance. Developing systems that meet these 
standards require an extensive amount of time and money. The 
extra resources needed to develop high quality systems forces 
businesses to make trade-offs in performance, security, and 
cost. Resilience is a broad term that describes systems that 
meet these requirements. Haimes presents a comprehensive 
view of resilient systems [1]. We build on Haime’s view and 
include resilient services in our definition. In our approach a 
resilient system and service is able to withstand a major 
disruption because of unknown events. The disruption’s 
impact must be measured within acceptable degradation 
parameters and yield recovery to a known good state within an 
acceptable amount of time. This paper will outline strategies 
to achieve cyber resilience in the context of 
service availability, cyber-attacks, and 
reduced cost utilizing the Self Cleansing 
Intrusion Tolerance (SCIT) system. 
 
A. SCIT 
 The Self-Cleansing Intrusion Tolerance 
(SCIT) system works to increase a system’s 
security by rotating servers periodically and 
restoring them to a clean image. SCIT 
improves security by decreasing the period 
 
 
of time in which a server is vulnerable to attack. Attackers 
usually remain in a compromised system for days, months, or 
even years. SCIT rotations can occur in minutes. The rapid 
frequency of rotations severely impacts an attacker’s ability to 
persist in the system, exfiltrate data, and modify the system.  
 
In order for an application to operate without issue on 
constantly rotating servers, the application must be sufficiently 
tolerant to availability failure. Usually this means offloading 
any state data to a separate application tier. For example, web-
session data could be offloaded to a distributed caching tier 
such as Redis or a relational database. File upload and 
download services could be offloaded to a distributed data 
store such as AWS Simple Storage Service (S3), Google 
Cloud Storage, or a network file system (NFS) storage cluster.  
 
In systems deploying Network Intrusion Detection Systems 
SCIT’s rotation scheme is often an adequate substitute for a 
host-based intrusion detection systems (HIDS), thus reducing 
the performance overhead because of HIDS. However, the 
SCIT system does require an increased amount of redundancy 
to facilitate the rotations. There is a constant amount of time to 
provision a server with the clean image. During this constant 
time the system will need a running server online and a server 
running that is being provisioned. As the rotation period 
decreases, the amount of additional servers that need to be 
provisioned increases. Figure 1 shows a SCIT system with a 
rotation period of 1 hour. The next server to rotate into an 
active state must be provisioned before the previous server is 
shutdown.  
 
This paper will focus on decreasing the cost required to 
operate the additional redundancy needed for a best practice, 
cloud-based security solution based on performing SCIT 
rotations. We will focus on using Amazon Web Services and 
Google Cloud Platform to compute the associated costs. Our 
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 baseline will take into account “on-demand” server resource 
costs in the two public clouds. We will then investigate the use 
of AWS’s Spot Instances and GCP’s Preemptive Instances to 
lower the operating costs.  
II. STRATEGIES FOR RESILIENCE 
A. Redundancy 
 There are many vectors to consider when building resilient 
systems that usually include different forms of redundancy. 
We will describe redundancy of physical machines, virtual 
machines (VMs), geographic locations, and network/cloud 
infrastructures. Redundant components incur a monetary cost 
to utilize and maintain.  
 
 
1) Physical Servers, Virtual Machines, and Containers 
 
 In the simplest case, a resilient system will need multiple 
physical servers running the same software to provide a 
failover system in case of a transient fault in software or 
hardware failure. It may also be required to perform load 
balancing with redundant physical servers to prevent system 
overload that would affect availability and performance. Load 
balancing can mitigate a high volume of traffic, but it is still 
necessary to have a failover machine cluster in case of 
complete failure. Physical servers are often replaced with VMs 
to optimize costs, automate processes, and more quickly 
recover. VMs can greatly improve performance of a 
distributed and clustered system, but there must also be 
redundant physical machines to prevent a hardware failure 
from disrupting many VM instances. Containerization 
technologies such as Docker and rkt (pronounced “Rocket”) 
should be treated 
similarly to VM 
instances in terms of 
requiring redundant 
physical hardware. 
There are still 
advantages to container 
technologies versus 
VMs in terms of 
portability, performance, and 
automation. Li et al. [2] expands on 
how to create high availability systems using a cloud provider. 
SCIT’s architecture supports container ready applications that 
can benefit from the increased speed and portability with little 
cost.  Containers can also be used to dramatically increase 
utilization, which can directly impact cost optimizations. 
 
2) Location Distribution 
 
 Location redundancy is a very important part of resilient 
systems in terms of performance and availability. Data center 
architectures usually contain some level of isolation and 
redundancy. Regions and Availability Zones are often used 
when discussing cloud architectures. A region is a group of 
availability zones within a relatively close proximity. AWS 
notes that availability zones are connected via private network 
lines where regions are connected via the Internet. Availability 
Zones can be thought of as a single data center or group of 
data centers where systems are isolated (dedicated power feed, 
dedicated network, etc.). The idea is that an availability zone 
can experience failure via a power or network outage and the 
other availability zones within the region can continue to 
operate because they do not rely on each other. There could be 
situations where increased load causes issues when multiple 
availability zones are unavailable which leads to a failure.  
 
 In order to build a resilient system, physical servers must be 
distributed across availability zones and regions. This reduces 
the reliance on a single data center or a group of data centers 
that could be affected by a natural disaster. Further, 
distributing a system to different regions through a content 
delivery network (CDN) can reduce the access time latency 
for users within that region.  
 
3) Provider Distribution 
 
 It is also important to consider the provider of your 
infrastructure. Even though both Amazon and Google operate 
massive infrastructures that would serve all of your system’s 
needs, it is not ideal to go “all in” with a single cloud service 
provider. Cloud services are growing at an accelerated pace 
which leads to complex environments and a lot of software. 
Software tends to have bugs and can be vulnerable to attack or 
failure. Your system may be perfect, but if a cloud service 
provider is infiltrated or software services crash, your system’s 
performance or availability could be adversely affected. 
Utilizing both AWS and Google Cloud Platform provides a 
stronger form of resilience that could be tolerant to 
uncontrollable cloud service failures. [3] suggests storing 
encryption keys on multiple cloud providers by using 
Shamir’s secret sharing algorithm. There are software 
products and platform layers that aid system designers and 
implementers to more effectively utilize multiple clouds. 
Pivotal’s Cloud Foundry platform-as-a-service (PaaS) can 
operate in multiple cloud environments to deploy systems. 
Netflix developed a continuous delivery (CD) tool called 
Spinnaker that aims to support multiple cloud environments 
including AWS, GCP, Microsoft’s Azure, and Pivotal’s Cloud 
Foundry PaaS.  
B. Diversity 
 Cyber attacks can cause crippling affects on a system’s 
resilience. In order to defend a system from common 
vulnerabilities, an approach utilizing system diversity can help 
Figure 2: Multi-Provider, Availability Zone, and Regional Redundancy 
 to segment attacks. Segmentation can work in tandem with 
redundancy to provide overall resilience. One diversity 
strategy that is simple to implement is server diversity. This 
type of diversity can be achieved by utilizing different 
infrastructure providers. GCP’s servers are quite different 
from AWS’s. More so, AWS’s and GCP’s managed services 
are implemented uniquely. For example, a vulnerability in an 
AWS load balancer may not be present in a Google Compute 
Engine Load Balancer. Diversity can be improved even more 
without a lot of complexity by utilizing different operating 
systems.  
 
 The SCIT rotation approach makes some of the low cost 
diversity approaches more effective. To illustrate this 
advantage, we will focus on two stronger forms of diversity to 
support resilient systems: Address Space Layout 
Randomization (ASLR) and N-Version Programming.  
 
1)  Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) 
 
 Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) is a defense 
mechanism at the operating system level to randomize the 
address space. This type of defense can mitigate return-
oriented programming attacks introduced by buffer overflow 
exploits. ASLR has been integrated into most modern 
operating systems as a primitive defense. Shacham et al. [4], 
yields that ASLR is not particularly effective as a sole means 
for defense against buffer overflow exploits. However, they do 
note that ASLR can slow down propagation of worms. In the 
case of SCIT, any amount of additional work needed by the 
attacker can help to improve the security of the system as a 
whole. ASLR only needs to thwart the attack for the duration 
of a rotation period where SCIT will take over by taking the 
current server under attack out of service and instantiating a 
new server with a different memory mapping.  Shacham et al., 
analyzed an implementation of a buffer overflow exploit to 
gain a remote shell on a system using ASLR. They were able 
to obtain the shell in about 200 seconds. A SCIT rotation 
period of 90 seconds would completely mitigate their attack.  
 
Bittau et al. [5] notes that a return oriented programming 
attack (ROP) can be disrupted by applying ASLR to all 
executable segments and frequent re-randomization. Thus a 
small enough SCIT rotation period increases the resilience and 
security of the service. Further, gaining a remote shell is 
usually only the first step in an attack for purposes of recon 
and probing of systems deeper within the network. SCIT 
rotations would continually slow down the process of probing 
even if the initial exploit was executed successfully. 
 
2) N-Version Programming 
 
 Another diversification strategy to enhance the resilience of 
a system is N-Version Programming. A majority of the 
literature on N-Version Programming recommends multiple 
isolated branches of the same business functionality. This is 
not practical to a commercial company from a cost perspective 
and maintainability. The SCIT rotation approach makes a 
weaker form of N-Version programming more effective. We 
recommend a weaker form of N-Version Programming 
suggested by Murphy et al. [6], where software is compiled 
with multiple compilers and varying compilation flags. The 
approach can be generalized to varying runtimes as well. This 
approach is easy to place within an existing development 
workflow with continuous integration (CI), continuous 
delivery (CD), and automated build systems.  
 
 Another form of weak N-Version Programming to facilitate 
diversity is varying containerized runtimes. You can use 
Docker’s Dockerfile to define a different virtualized operating 
system to run on top of a host OS. This could involve using 
different libraries, compilers, and runtimes (including JRE 
versions). Docker containers are advantageous because of 
their portability across Linux machines. You can implement 
two levels of diversification by varying base OS distributions 
of the VM/physical server illustrated in figure 3. 
Diversification with N-Version programming can aid in 
slowing down vulnerability exploitation and sequential 
knowledge building for more extensive system attacks. 
 
 With this approach, each successive iteration of a SCIT VM 
will have the same functionality but a different footprint. This 
makes it more difficult for the attacker to exploit system 
vulnerabilities. 
 
 
Figure 3: Example of Diversifying Software 
III. CLOUD PLATFORM PRICING MODELS 
Cloud providers that offer servers and services on-demand 
have to predict usage to optimize their physical resources. 
This is a difficult task since on-demand usage lends itself to 
experimentation and the customer’s own cost savings 
approaches by shutting down servers that are not being used. 
For example, many large-scale websites will run a base load to 
accommodate normal traffic and then provision additional 
servers when traffic increases. AWS and GCP both have to 
maintain a physical infrastructure to accommodate their 
customers’ maximum scale-up. Most of the time, these extra 
resources are idle which led to a new pricing model for excess 
resources. AWS calls these resources Spot Instances and GCP 
calls them Preemptive Instances. 
 
 A. AWS Spot Market 
AWS’s spot instances operate within a supply and demand 
market where customers programmatically bid on resources at 
a discounted rate. If demand increases within the market or if 
supply decreases, the prices will go up. If the price rises above 
a customer’s maximum bid, the server will be shutdown after 
a two-minute warning. Ben-Yehuda et al., suggests that AWS 
Spot pricing is not actually determined by bidding. They 
concluded that Amazon sets a hidden reserve price based on 
their supply of resources and prediction of utilization [7]. 
There are conflicting reports that conclude bidding prices are 
input into the pricing function. Either conclusion does not 
affect our strategy in optimizing an overall system’s cost. 
 
B. GCP Preemptive Instances 
GCP’s preemptive instances operate at a higher level of 
abstraction than AWS’s spot instances. GCP hides the market 
change from its customers, which makes the process simpler. 
GCP notes that instances can be utilized at up to a 70% 
discount. GCP only sends a 30 second warning when an 
instance is preempted, or terminated, compared to AWS’s two 
minute warning.  
 
C. AWS and GCP Billing Periods 
Another notable difference between AWS and GCP are 
their pricing periods. AWS bills per hour and GCP bills per 
minute. For normal applications, the billing period does not 
make a significant difference, but SCIT’s rotation cycle causes 
this issue to be significant. For example, if a customer boots 
up an AWS VM for 10 minutes, then they are charged for the 
full hour. If a GCP VM were booted for 10 minutes, the 
customer would only be charged for the 10 minutes it was 
online. GCP has a 10 minute minimum billing period. AWS 
combines instance duration per hour so that you are not billed 
per individual instance within an instance type. For example, a 
customer can start two identical EC2 instances, run them for 
10 minutes, and they are only charged for 1 hour considering 
the 20 minutes of usage. Spot instances follow a different 
model since you are bidding for a specific instance. Therefore, 
if a customer boots up two spot instances, each for 10 minutes, 
they are billed 1 hour for each spot instance, totaling two 
hours of use. A spot instance is charged for 1 hour after 
booting, but if a spot instance is stopped before the two-hour 
mark, the customer is only charged for 1 hour of use [8]. 
Together with SCIT concepts we will use this strategy to 
optimize servers and system rotation periods when using AWS 
spot instances. 
 
D. AWS Reserved Instances 
 AWS offers reserved instances to customers that agree to 
use a VM for a certain time period in exchange for a discount 
per hour. Right now, the time frames are one year or three 
years. The customer can elect to pay all upfront, partial 
upfront, or no upfront (only for the one year reserved). An all-
upfront, three year reserved instance offers the largest discount 
while the one-year no upfront offers the smallest discount.  
 
E. GCP Sustained Discount 
 GCP does not have an equivalent offering like AWS 
reserved instances. However, GCP offers a discount for 
sustained usage per month. Sustained usage is calculated by 
breaking a month up into four parts. Discounted rates are 
applied per sector. The discounts vary per instance, but a 20%-
30% discount can be achieved with sustained usage. GCP 
calculates all VMs in use (inferred instances), which allows 
customers to start and stop VMs while still benefiting from the 
sustained usage discounts [9].  
IV. ECONOMIC OPTIMIZATION WITH SCIT 
A. SCIT Process Optimizations 
 SCIT lowers the security overhead by reducing the amount 
of time necessary to perform security functions. In a 
conventional system (no-SCIT), a lot of the time is needed to 
investigate and respond to a security event because the system 
is still operating in a production environment. After an attack, 
a system usually has to failover or rollback to a safe state. In 
SCIT the VM is regularly decommissioned and thus easier to 
analyze. 
 
B. SCIT Operational Optimizations with AWS 
A SCIT system can be effectively operated while drastically 
lowering the cost of redundancy in the AWS cloud 
environment. Our sample operational scenario is a Spring 
Boot application that has file upload and download 
functionality to AWS S3.  
 
The application will operate on AWS with all spot 
instances. Since spot instances can be reclaimed by AWS at 
anytime and are not guaranteed to be available, we will use a 
pool of four on-demand hot swappable instances. Each 
instance takes three minutes to provision with the Spring Boot 
application. Our on-demand instances will be provisioned and 
then stopped. On-demand instances that are stopped do not 
incur service charges except for elastic block storage (EBS) 
Figure 4: AWS Spot Instance Cost (rotating ~ 1/hr) 
Figure 5: AWS On-Demand Instance Cost (rotating ~ 1/hr) 
 volumes. For this application, we only need an EBS volume 
large enough to hold our Spring Boot application, so the 
charge will be insignificant. 
 
Our sample file upload and download application is 
deployed within a SCIT-like system rotating approximately 
every one hour and runs on M4.Large AWS EC2 instances. 
We accounted for a peak load period of 4 hours per day (2 
hours in the morning and 2 hours in the evening), where spot 
instances will be booted to accommodate the extra volume. 
The rest of the time, we will keep two spot instances available 
to serve requests. This deployment scenario will cost 
approximately $61.20 per month assuming an average spot 
price of $0.03 and peak load requiring an additional 5 spot 
instances. Figure 4 shows the breakdown. A comparable 
deployment scenario utilizing only on-demand instances 
would cost around $259.20 per month. The redundancy while 
provisioning on-demand instances incurs a $14.40 charge per 
month for the two extra hours needed. Note that there is no 
additional cost for the redundant spot VMs because we are 
utilizing AWS’s second hour grace period for spot instances. 
Figure 5 shows the breakdown of cost for an on-demand only 
deployment. Using only on-demand instances is four times 
more expensive than using spot instances. If the system is 
already compatible with SCIT (meaning fault tolerant to 
reboots and statelessness), then we can achieve these cost 
savings with little effort. As the system grows, the cost 
savings will also grow since we are able to scale up with spot 
instances during peak load.  
 
AWS’s billing period causes issues when trying to achieve a 
system rotation period less than 1 hour with spot instances. It 
is more cost efficient to use reserved and on-demand instances 
when trying to achieve very short rotation periods. AWS on-
demand instances with a five-minute rotation period will be 
billed two times the amount of a single instance per hour. This 
is because of the redundancy needed to provision an instance 
before it is online. We are able to limit the costs with the one-
hour rotation period by only leaving the instance online for 55 
minutes, which allows five minutes for provisioning.  
 
C. SCIT Operational Optimizations with GCP 
 GCP’s prices per instance hour are very similar to AWS’s. 
Google’s N1-Standard-2 is comparable to AWS’s M4.Large in 
terms of specifications. The preemptible pricing is $0.03 per 
hour, which is the same as AWS’s average spot price for the 
M4.Large. The N1-Standard-2 is priced at $0.10 per hour 
without sustained usage and $0.07 with full-sustained usage. 
AWS’s pricing for the M4.Large is $0.12, so Google’s pricing 
is slightly cheaper.  
 
 GCP’s billing period is per minute with a 10-minute 
minimum after the first two minutes. This billing model 
allows us to optimize our costs when we set our rotation 
period to less than one hour. We can achieve a similar cost as 
the AWS usage scenario depicted in Figure 4 with a 10-minute 
rotation period. Assuming a three-minute provision time, we 
can expect to accumulate an additional 27 minutes per hour or 
648 minutes per day because of the redundancy needed to 
rotate and provision VMs.  For preemptible instances the cost 
to operate 648 minutes is an additional $0.324 per day per 
instance. On-demand instances will incur an additional $0.756 
per day.  
 
V. SERVERLESS EXECUTION 
 SCIT focuses on the security of servers since this is a major 
security concern to organizations. Cloud providers have given 
customers the tools to think of servers as immutable 
infrastructure. We can just as easily provision a new VM with 
an image modification than to change something on the 
existing machine. Cloud providers are now pushing the idea 
further with managed code execution. AWS offers a service 
called Lambda that will execute code within its compatible 
runtimes, which includes Java, NodeJS, and Python. The 
customer simply uploads an archive of code and Lambda will 
take care of provisioning a virtual container to run the code. 
The code can read and write files when executing, but the 
environment will be reset on every execution and will not be 
running at all when it is not called. The notion of a serverless 
operating environment is very attractive in terms of security, 
cost, and architecture. 
 
 First, there is a much smaller attack surface when executing 
on a platform that does not allow you to open ports, run 
multiple applications, and that is not online all of the time. The 
environment is similar to what SCIT achieves in server 
operation by resetting the virtual space. However, AWS 
Lambda and other similar services do not reboot the actual 
server running the containers as SCIT would. This means that 
if an attacker was able to break out of the container and 
assume control of the host machine, then all containers 
running code on the machine would be vulnerable to attack. 
Second, the billing model for the Lambda service is much 
different than EC2. Lambda bills per 100 milliseconds of 
Figure 6: GCP Preemptible Instance Cost (rotating ~ 10 mins) 
Figure 7: GCP On-demand Instance Cost (rotating ~ 10 mins) 
 execution time [10]. The Lambda function is triggered by 
some external source which could be an S3 file upload, an 
HTTP request to AWS’s managed API Gateway, or a time 
clock for cron-like executions. The only resource that can be 
customized when running on Lambda is RAM which ranges 
from 128MB to 1.5GB which also affects the CPU speed 
AWS provisions for you. AWS has made the first 3.2 million 
compute seconds free per month for 128MB Lambdas. For a 
lot of applications, architecting for Lambda compatibility 
would significantly reduce the cost required to operate, even 
when comparing against spot or preemptible pricing. After the 
allotted free Lambda executions, pricing begins at 
$0.000000208 per 100 milliseconds. Figure 8 shows the 
estimated cost for operating a similar application to figures 4-
7. It uses a 512 MB Lambda function utilized 100% of the 
time with 1 request/second. AWS does not charge for the first 
800,000 execution seconds for a 512 MB function and the first 
1,000,000 function requests, which makes Lambda about 75% 
cheaper than AWS spot instances. Lastly, the architecture that 
Lambda promotes is similar to the fault tolerant engineering 
that SCIT requires which means applications can be easily 
transferred between SCIT and Lambda without a lot of 
architectural overhead. The application must be stateless and 
offload service tiers for storage and, in Lambda’s case, HTTP 
endpoints.  The code is forced into being loosely coupled since 
each application is broken up into separate Lambda functions 
that cannot communicate except through external application 
tiers.  
 
 AWS is in charge of managing its fleet of servers to operate 
the virtual environments that Lambda executes from. In order 
to operate this fleet effectively in terms of cost and 
performance, AWS Lambda functions are limited to a five-
minute execution time. Patching, code isolation, and 
immediate execution with no provisioning time are all 
provided by AWS. 
 
 GCP launched a service called Google Cloud Functions that 
aims to compete with AWS Lambda. The service is currently 
in an Alpha stage, as of June 2016, that requires filling out a 
form and acceptance by Google to trial the service [11].  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 We cannot avoid failures or successful attacks all of the 
time, thus our push is to design resilient and secure systems in 
tandem. This presents a big challenge in the dynamic cloud 
ecosystem. SCIT’s requirements for redundancy and 
architectural constraints of statelessness have an impact on 
how a system is engineered. These design decisions lead to a 
more resilient system by engineering around the idea that 
failure will occur often. SCIT’s approach is general to servers 
and can be implemented on a wide variety of applications. 
AWS and GCP’s excess resource capacity can be used to 
significantly reduce the cost of operating a system that can 
withstand failure. We were able to provide redundancy while 
reducing the cost of operating an application without 
redundancy. Further, managed code execution services such as 
AWS Lambda and GCP’s Google Cloud Functions can 
significantly reduce the cost of operating a resilient system 
even in comparison to spot and preemptible VMs. System 
design is usually composed of tradeoffs between security and 
performance because of the cost of redundancy and 
complexity of managing redundant systems. This paper shows 
that creating a resilient system in terms of security, 
availability, and performance can yield significant economical 
advantages to organizations. 
 
In this paper we have discussed examples of applying SCIT 
to two public clouds. However, SCIT and our analysis can be 
readily extended to hybrid systems like private and public 
clouds, clouds from multiple vendors, and a mix of on-premise 
systems and cloud environments. This paper demonstrates cost 
effective solutions to meet customer resiliency requirements 
utilizing the SCIT approach. 
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